Over the same period, the proportion of blacks living in "high poverty" urban neighborhoods increased sharply, and black ghettos turned increasingly "bad" in the sense that residential segregation led to increasingly poor socioeconomic outcomes among young blacks.
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The post-1970 rise in concentrated poverty in black central-city neighborhoods has received a great deal of scholarly attention. One prominent view, associated with the work of William Julius Wilson, is that the underlying causes of this adverse trend are essentially macroeconomic in nature. 6 Technological change and the relative decline of manufacturing employment may have reduced relatively high-wage job openings for urban, unskilled workers. The geographic concentration of poverty was then reinforced by the movement of relatively well-off blacks from central-city neighborhoods to suburbs and the proliferation of single-parent households. Another prominent view, associated primarily with the work of Massey and Denton, emphasizes that preexisting residential segregation and ongoing racial discrimination in housing allowed for the potent endogenous magnification of adverse economic shocks. Feedback among macroeconomic forces, residential segregation, and social norms may have pushed entire neighborhoods into a downward socioeconomic spiral. 7 The hypothesis we are pursuing is that the riots may be examples of such negative shocks.
Like any shock, some of a riot's impact will be felt directly-in this case, by individuals who were immediately affected by the event. To some extent, these effects may be offset by private sector responses (for example, insurance payments) or changes in government policies (subsidies or loans to riot-afflicted businesses or infrastructure investment in riot areas). But other, and potentially much larger, effects may be indirect. A riot might alter the course of a city's economy by influencing the economic decisions of individuals who were not directly affected by the event. In essence, the hypothesis under investigation has two parts: that a riot's effect on African Americans' labor market outcomes was, on net, negative; and that the magnitude of the local effect increased with the severity of the local riot.
We present two complementary empirical analyses. The first uses aggregate, city-level data on income, employment, unemployment, and the area's racial composition from the published volumes of the federal censuses. 8 After constructing an index of riot severity, we estimate the "riot effect" by both ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS). The second empirical approach uses individual-level census data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata series for 1950, 1970, and 1980. 9 We adopt a difference-in-difference framework to compare blacks' labor market outcomes in cities that had severe riots with blacks' outcomes in cities that did not have severe riots, after controlling for a variety of relevant individual characteristics.
The findings, which are broadly consistent across different types of data and estimation techniques, suggest that the riots had negative effects on blacks' income and employment that were economically significant and that seem to have been larger in the long run than in the short run . We view these findings as suggestive rather than definitive for two reasons. First, the data are not detailed enough to identify the precise mechanisms at work. Second, the wave of riots may have had negative spillover effects to cities that did not experience severe riots; if so, we would tend to underestimate the riots' overall effect.
The 1960s Riots in Historical Perspective
The United States has a long and terrible history of race-related riots. Gilje documents scores of riots including antebellum attacks on free blacks, Civil War draft riots in the North that targeted blacks for abuse, Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction collective violence against southern blacks, and inner-city eruptions during World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II when blacks competed with whites for jobs and housing. 10 The riots of the summer of 1943 provide the closest parallel to those of the 1960s. There were close to fifty riots in that year, including one in Detroit in which thirty-four people were killed (twenty-five of them black). Harlem also erupted in violence, and although the riot was not as severe as Detroit's in fatalities, looting and property destruction occurred on a large and possibly unprecedented scale. One thousand and five hundred stores were looted or damaged, virtually all in predominantly black neighborhoods. 11 The riots during the 1960s were not unprecedented in their individual severity (measured by number of deaths), but as a group, their high frequency, wide geographic distribution, and destructiveness were unique. The 1960s riots were historically unusual in that they were characterized by what sociologists called "black aggression" (though the aggression was rarely directed toward physically harming white civilians), in contrast to most previous significant race-related riots, which were characterized by whites attacking blacks. 12 4
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10. Gilje (1996) . 11. Gilje (1996, p. 158) .
12. There were, of course, instances of violence against white bystanders, police, and shop owners. Nonetheless, the Kerner Commission report asserts: "While the civil disorders of 1967 were racial in character, they were not interracial. The 1967 disorders, as well as earlier disorders of the recent period, involved action within Negro neighborhoods against symbols of white American society-authority and property-rather than against white persons " (1968, p. 110) .
13. Spilerman (1970; 1971) . 14. The Kerner Commission report (National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders [1968] ) was preceded by hearings before the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations headed by John L. McClellan. U.S. Senate (1967) . The subcommittee's staff identified cities that had experienced riots and then surveyed the mayors of those cities seeking information about the proximate causes and severity of the event. The McClellan data cover the years 1965 to 1967 and, therefore, do not include riots occurring in 1968 (such as those following the assassination of Martin Luther King). It is not clear from the testimony of Robert Emmet Dunne and Crichton Jones, who collected and organized the subcommittee's statistics, exactly how the cities were identified, or what criteria were used to determine whether the disturbance was "major" and therefore worthy of inclusion in the study. See part 1 of the hearings for the testimony, data, and the survey instrument sent to the mayors.
15. The McClellan report (see note 14) appears to use the most stringent criteria, with an emphasis on high levels of violence (number of deaths), involvement of law enforcement (number of arrests), and destruction of physical property (looting, arson), while the Lemberg Center used the loosest criteria. Unfortunately, the data collected by the Lemberg Center do not overlap (in timing) those collected by McClellan or Kerner, since they start in 1968 and end in 1971. The Times index essentially replicates the material found in the other sources.
16. Carter (1986) .
occurrences of arson, and deaths. We use Carter's data to construct an index of riot severity that is central to our measurement of the riots' effects. Each riot (indexed by j) is assigned a value S j = S i (X ij /X iT ) where X ij is a component of severity (deaths, injuries, arrests, arsons, and days of rioting) and X iT is the sum of component X ij across all riots. That is, S j is the proportion of all riot deaths that occurred during riot j, plus the proportion of all riot injuries that occurred during riot j, plus the proportion of all arrests, and so on. Summed over all riots, there are five total index points (a reflection of the five components that enter the index). We add the index values for each riot within a city to form a cumulative citylevel riot severity measure. The potential shortcomings of the index are clear. Counts of destructive events do not necessarily correspond to economic damage, let alone to a riot's impact on economic agents' expectations. One might argue, for example, that potentially important components are missing from the index, or that given the existing components, some should weigh more heavily than others.
17 Nonetheless, we believe that the index is a useful measure of riot severity for several reasons. First, the individual components of the index are highly positively correlated, and so in practice it matters little if, for example, we treat the proportion of deaths as "more important" than the proportion of injuries.
18 Given the rather high correlations among observable measures of severity, one might reasonably expect that they are well correlated with unobservable components as well. Second, any alternative choice of weights would necessarily be as ad hoc as our choice of equal weights.
19 Third, to conserve degrees of freedom, to facilitate instrumental variable estimation, and given the 6
17. Unfortunately, consistent value-based measures of property damage do not exist. 18. Nonetheless, we do note some results from regressions run using deaths as the only measure of severity. The correlations among deaths, arsons, arrests, and injuries across riots are high: at least 0.64 (deaths and injuries) and as high as 0.87 (deaths and arsons). Correlations of these variables with days of riots are somewhat lower, ranging from 0.32 to 0.48. All correlations are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Later in the paper, we sum S j over riots within cities for the city-level measures of riot severity. To test the robustness of this index, we created five alternative indexes, each of which omitted one of the observed severity components. The resulting indexes were highly correlated with one another and with the base index used here, with a correlation coefficient ranging from 0.96 to 0.99.
19. Our measure of riot severity is "absolute" in the sense that we do not scale severity by population; however, our city-level regressions control for population directly or indirectly in the IPUMS regressions when we include area fixed effects.
components' positive correlation, the use of an index is far more practical than entering each component separately in the regressions. Table 1 summarizes each component of the index by year and reports the overall index by year and census region. The most obvious aspect of the data is the strong concentration of riot activity in 1967 and 1968, which together account for 3.3 out of the 5.0 total index points. When the index numbers are arrayed by census region, there seems to be a comparatively even geographic spread of riot activity, with the Midwest (1.57) and South (1.53) outpacing the Northeast (1.11) and West (0.79) . 20 This impression is true in the sense that major riots occurred in every region, but it is misleading because the "severity" was heavily concentrated in a relatively small number of events (and cities), not spread evenly over them. For example, no deaths occurred in 91 percent of the 752 riots underlying table 1, and just six riots account for nearly 60 percent of the fatalities (228). By far the most deadly riots were in Detroit in July 1967 (43 deaths), Los Angeles in August 1965 (34 deaths), and Newark in July 1967 (24 deaths). 21 Using the index as a broader measure of severity, the riot in Washington following Martin Luther King's assassination (S = 0.34) would join Los Angeles in 1965 (0.48), Detroit in 1967 (0.44), and Newark in 1967 (0.23) as the most severe events on record. Fully 90 percent of the riots receive index values of less than 0.01. As we discuss, the intercity variation in riot severity will play a key role in our empirical strategy for measuring the riots' effects on labor market outcomes.
Causes of the Riots
The occurrence of the riots at a time when, at the national level, blacks' economic prospects were improving belies any simple causal connection running from economic status to riot severity. Although postriot government reports and journalistic accounts are replete with speculation and anecdotal evidence, the causes of the 1960s riots became a major research topic in sociology in the early 1970s. The point of departure for nearly all subsequent academic work was a series of papers 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 Source: Carter (1986) .
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Note: See text for definition of a riot. Each riot (j) is assigned a value S j =
where X ij is a component of severity (days of rioting, injuries, arrests, deaths, and arsons) and X iT is the sum of X ij across all riots. Summed over all riots in the data set, there are five total index points (a reflection of the five components that enter the index).
by Spilerman, which estimated multivariate models of riot incidence and severity. 22 In this work, the unit of observation was the city, and the independent variables were drawn from the 1950 and 1960 federal censuses and related government documents. Spilerman's principal finding was simple: the absolute size of the black population (positively correlated with riots) and southern location (negatively correlated with riots) were the best predictors (in a statistical sense) of the incidence and severity of the riots. He found little support for many other seemingly plausible explanatory factors, including a variety of indicators of blacks' absolute and relative (to whites) economic status. 23 Thus, taken literally, Spilerman found that conditional on black population size and region, severe riots were essentially idiosyncratic events. The chronologies of specific riots suggest this is not as far-fetched an interpretation as it might at first sound. In many (perhaps most) cases, there were identifiable, idiosyncratic "sparks" that, through a series of unforeseen complications, turned a minor altercation into a full-blown riot. The spark might be an encounter gone wrong between a black motorist and the police (as in Watts), or an impromptu, incendiary speech by activist H. Rap Brown (as noted in a congressional report). 24 The most incendiary event was surely the assassination of Martin Luther King in April 1968, after which more than one hundred riots erupted.
Subsequent research has modified Spilerman's work by improving the quality of the riot data, using event history analysis, introducing covariates that were not available to (or not considered by) Spilerman, and extending the time frame under study. 25 But nearly all of the "second-generation" studies confirm Spilerman's original finding that black population size and region are the most consistent and quantitaWilliam J. Collins and Robert A. Margo 9 22. Spilerman (1970 , 1971 , 1976 . 23. Spilerman and subsequent authors relate riots to socioeconomic conditions in 1950 or 1960 census data. It is unknown whether short-term movements in socioeconomic conditions (for example, between 1960 and 1965) would be more useful predictors of riot activity. Recently, Chandra and Foster (forthcoming) reported state-level evidence suggesting a complex relationship between riot occurrence and the residual wage gap between blacks and whites (after accounting for observable differences in human capital). Spilerman (1976) argues that, on average, riot severity was higher for early riots in a city than for later riots.
24. The Senate Hearings on Riots, Civil, and Criminal Disorders (1967, part 1) contain a table describing "major riots," including their "triggering incident." 25. Lieske (1978); Carter (1986 Carter ( , 1990 ; Olzak and others (1996) ; Myers (1997; ; DiPasquale and Glaeser (1998); Chandra and Foster (forthcoming) . tively important explanatory variables for riot incidence and severity in the 1960s.
26
Most recently, Myers has found that contagion played a role in determining the geographic pattern of riots. 27 Riots were given extensive television news coverage, suggesting one mechanism (not the only one) by which an outbreak of violence in one city might spill over to another, especially if they shared the same media outlets. This contagion effect seems to have waned quickly over time. The occurrence of a second (or higher-order) riot also seems to have been more likely following an initial disturbance, though within cities, riots declined in severity over time. 28 The sociological studies cannot rule out the possibility of underlying city-specific causes, but it is clear that matching the events to observable city-level correlates, beyond location, black population size, and proximity to other riots, is extremely difficult.
How Might Riots Affect Labor Markets?
Our model supposes that people and businesses choose locations that maximize utility and profits respectively. Household utility is a function of the benefits and costs associated with inhabiting a particular space. The benefits come in many forms: access to local public goods (schools, churches, entertainment, and so on), proximity to one's place of work, and proximity to one's friends and family. The costs include rent or mortgage interest payments, property upkeep and insurance, and taxes. For businesses, the benefits derive from the flow of revenue associated with the location, which might depend on demand from local residents or on proximity to other businesses. The costs derive from rent or mortgage interest payments, labor costs, property upkeep and insurance, and taxes. We suppose that in the short run, movement is inhibited by fixed costs associated with "starting over" in new locations.
The occurrence of a riot may have direct and indirect effects on the level and location of economic activity. The direct effects are experienced by individuals whose connection to the riot is immediate: an injured rioter, a resident whose home is in the line of fire, a business owner whose establishment is torched or looted, and so on. For some individuals, the direct effects are irreversible (obviously, for anyone who is killed), but for others, the effect may be transitory, depending on subsequent decisions made in light of changed perceptions of the economic environment.
Consider, for example, a business owner whose establishment is damaged or looted and, therefore, is temporarily shut down. Whether or not the business reopens depends on the expected benefits and costs of doing so at that location relative to all others (and relative to staying permanently closed and putting the remaining capital to some other use).
29 For some, the costs of rebuilding or restocking may be covered by insurance or public subsidies, but others may be uninsured or ineligible for assistance. Looking forward, the expected costs of operation in that location may increase after the riots. There may be higher insurance costs, expenses from the installation of additional security features (fire and burglar alarms), higher interest rates on small business loans, and higher taxes to pay for redistribution programs or an increased police presence.
30
At the same time, the expected benefits of being in that location might fall, especially if the firm's revenue depends heavily on business from nearby firms or residents.
If only direct effects come into play, the labor market implications of a riot might be small and short-lived, especially when viewed at the city 29. A business may be viable in the short run-that is, with its capital stock fixed-but only because it can cover variable costs, not because the rate of profit is "normal" in the long run. Even if the costs of rebuilding are covered by insurance or other means and the costs of operation do not rise, it may not pay to reopen if, before the riot, the business was not economically viable in the long-run sense. Some such owners may relocate elsewhere in the city, but others may leave entirely, taking whatever capital remains with them.
30. On higher insurance costs see Aldrich and Reiss (1970) ; Bean (2000) . There were reasonable grounds for expectations of higher taxes for redistribution and police. For example, the Governor's Commission report on the Watts riot made three "high-priority" recommendations: "cooperative programs" with businesses for the training and employment of blacks, "a new and costly approach to educating the Negro child," and increased police efforts on crime prevention and community relations (1965, p. 8) . Systematic evidence on the extent to which such programs were actually undertaken is scarce. See Hahn (1970) for some discussion of the issue.
level. Even at their worst, the 1960s riots never directly involved vast numbers of people or vast amounts of capital. For example, property damage during the Detroit riot in July 1967 was approximately $50 million, a small share of total property value in the city. The great majority of Detroit's 500,000 black residents at the time had no direct involvement in the riot. 31 The worst of the direct effects were borne by the residents and businesses located in the general vicinity of 12th Street, where the riot originated after a police raid on a "blind pig" (an after-hours drinking establishment).
However, even if the direct effects are limited, a riot's ultimate economic impact may be magnified through endogenously propagated indirect effects that unfold over a longer period. After a riot, firms and residents might revise their expectations of the benefits, costs, and risks of locating in or near a particular central-city neighborhood even if they were not directly affected by the riot. If some residents leave and firms close because of the initial shock (and are not replaced instantaneously), local economic activity and employment may slacken. The web of potential knock-on effects is extensive: personal income and local business revenues may fall, local sources of tax revenue may diminish, the area may experience a rise in crime and a decline in publicly provided services, and declining rents and property values (and perhaps the outmigration of the relatively well-off) may exacerbate the concentration of poverty in inner-city neighborhoods. Along the lines of Wilson and Massey and Denton, the idea is that a process of negative decline may reinforce itself and may be concentrated in predominantly black neighborhoods.
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The downward spiral could continue, in theory, until the location is entirely abandoned, with all workers and capital relocating elsewhere. In practice, owing to the large stock of immobile residential capital, nontrivial relocation costs, and perhaps government efforts at revitalization, the spiral may eventually arrest itself. 33 But the new labor market equilibrium may differ significantly from the initial equilibrium. The central city may have fewer employed workers who earn lower wages than before (essentially reflecting a leftward shift of labor demand), and it may have fewer high human-capital residents (reflecting relocation to the suburbs or other cities). 34 Relatively poor central city blacks may be especially unlikely to relocate from adversely affected areas because of a variety of labor, housing, and credit market imperfections, including, but not limited to, racial discrimination.
In sum, a riot could lead to a decline in economic activity because of the destruction of physical capital, a rise in costs of production, and a decline in perceived security. Although it is difficult to be precise about the nature of the link, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the net effects, if any, are increasing with the severity of the riot. Because the riots were concentrated in central-city black neighborhoods, it also seems reasonable to hypothesize that the effects, if any, were felt most strongly by central-city black residents. In predominantly black neighborhoods, those with the most capital at stake and those facing the highest potential tax burdens would have the greatest incentive (and ability) to relocate. White central-city neighborhoods might lose residents and businesses as well, not because of direct physical destruction of property, but because of changes in expected taxes, security costs, and public services. Again, those with the most capital at stake and those with the most taxable resources would have the greatest incentive to depart for the suburbs or, perhaps, other cities.
Empirical Framework
We use variation across cities in the severity of the riots to estimate their impact on African Americans' labor market outcomes. The validity of this strategy depends on two assumptions. First, we assume that the riots' effects were concentrated in the cities that experienced riots. In the-34. With perfectly mobile labor, a leftward demand shift in the central city would be followed immediately by outmigration such that wages would equalize across locations. With imperfectly mobile labor, any such response would take time, and wages would be depressed during the period of adjustment. If the skill mix of the central city changes (because of selective outmigration), observed wages will be lower in the new equilibrium. Blanchard and Katz (1992) explore the dynamics of adjustments to labor demand shocks at the state-level in the 1978-90 period. In their model, a decline in wages in one location (relative to wages elsewhere) attracts firms seeking to minimize labor costs. If so, wages and employment tend to move back toward their initial levels. Empirically, they find that this job-creation mechanism is not strong and that outmigration plays a key role in adjusting to the shock. ory, however, it is possible that very well-integrated labor markets could dissipate adverse shocks quickly, leaving no trace of a wage effect in cross-city comparisons (though possibly leaving evidence of migration). And if the riots had strong intercity spillover effects on perceptions of the benefits and costs associated with central-city locations, then cross-city comparisons would tend to understate the riots' impact. The second major assumption is that the geographic distribution of riots was exogenous to blacks' economic status before the riots. We have already discussed the sociology literature's findings about this idea. If the riot variation is essentially random, then estimation by ordinary least squares is straightforward. Nevertheless, we report estimates for specifications that control directly for pre-1960 trends in labor market outcomes. We also relax the riot exogeneity assumption by pursuing two-stage least squares estimates.
Our analysis draws on two sources of information about labor market outcomes: city-level data from the published census volumes and individual-level data for metropolitan areas from the IPUMS. 35 The published city-level data are particularly useful in this case because the IPUMS sample for 1960 does not identify cities and because, in the 1970 and 1980 samples, metropolitan area or central city status is undisclosed for some households. The main advantage of the individual-level data is that one can observe and control for a variety of individual and household characteristics. For now, we restrict our attention to changes in income, employment, unemployment, and the racial composition of city populations.
City-Level Approach
We focus on cities with total populations of at least 100,000 and black populations of at least 1,000 in 1960, providing a base sample of 130 cities. 36 We also exclude cities that, according to the relevant issues of the County and City Data Book, had large changes in boundaries during the period under study. 37 For each city, we summed the index values for each riot (as already defined) that occurred between 1964 and 1971. In the following regressions, the index is first entered in quadratic form as an explanatory variable for changes in black labor market outcomes. Then, to simplify the analysis, we split cities into two groups, "severe" and "not severe" on the basis of the index values. 38 A relatively small number of cities fall into the "severe" group, but they account for the overwhelming majority of deaths, injuries, arrests, and arsons in the sample. For example, 77 percent of the deaths in the base sample occurred in the "severe" riot cities. On the basis of the index, the severe riot cities are Los Angeles, Detroit, Washington, Newark, Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, New York, Mobile, and San Francisco.
In the simple "severe dummy variable" specification, let y stand for an economic outcome and S stand for the severity of the 1960s riots (S = 1 if riots were "severe"), and consider the following two regression equations:
(1)
The X vector includes a set of city-level characteristics such as region indicators, the manufacturing proportion of employment in 1960, black population size in 1960, and total population size in 1960. The treatment group consists of blacks living in cities for which S = 1, and the control group consists of blacks living in cities for which S = 0. 39 Essentially, this is a difference-in-difference (DD) estimator in which time-invariant cityspecific effects, region-specific trends, and city-invariant period-specific effects are differenced out, and identification comes from differences in changes in y across the two groups of cities (conditional on X). 40 In equa-38. A city's index is considered "severe" (= 1) if the index value falls into approximately ninetieth percentile (or higher) of the distribution of severity. See the text for a list of the severe riot cities 39. Data are not reported for black income and unemployment for 1960. Rather, the data pertain to the nonwhite population. For most cities, the black and nonwhite proportions of the population in 1960 are very similar. The results are similar if we exclude cities with substantial fractions of nonblack nonwhites.
40. In principle, using white outcomes as an additional level of control, one could pursue a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimator. One might hope that this third "difference" would absorb race-invariant city-specific shocks and trends, but because tion 1, g is a rough measure of the "short-run" impact of a severe riot; that is, the effect (if any) in the census closest in time to the period of the riots (1970) relative to the "preriot" census (1960). Equation 2 measures the "long-run" impact. Since many of the "not severe" cities did have small riots, g should be interpreted as the effect of severe riots over and above any effects associated with small riots (as opposed to the effect of a severe riot relative to a no-riot counterfactual).
In general, unobserved trends and shocks that are correlated with the occurrence of "treatment" threaten the credibility of difference-in-difference estimators. Controlling for observable economic characteristics, perhaps including the 1950 to 1960 trend in labor market outcomes, may reduce the scope for bias from unobserved shocks and trends-the idea being that cities similar on observables may be similar on unobservables as well. Alternatively, instrumental variables may help isolate variation in riot severity that is plausibly exogenous to unobserved labor market shocks and trends.
One possible set of instrumental variables derives from differences in city government structure. The sociology literature suggests that differences in governmental form may have implied differences in responsiveness to the political interests of the local black population and therefore differences in the likelihood and severity of riots.
41 Along these lines, many riots were preceded by a series of racial incidents spread over a period of weeks, and it is possible that some governmental forms responded more effectively to alleviate the building tension. We use a dummy variable indicating the presence of a city manager to help predict the incidence of riots even after controlling for black population size and region. 42 We take the position that the government's structure is unlikely it is highly plausible that whites in riot-cities responded in some way to the "treatment" event, it is difficult to justify using whites as an additional control group. Moreover, the 1960 census volumes do not report white-specific outcomes at the city level. We can measure black outcomes relative to the overall city outcomes, but this is highly imperfect because blacks were a substantial proportion of many cities' populations. Backing out figures for whites would be possible if (for example) citywide and nonwhite average incomes were reported, but in fact, the tables report medians. In the following pages, we do report some DDD estimators using the IPUMS data. 41. See Lieberson and Silverman (1965); Spilerman (1971 Spilerman ( , 1976 . 42. Additional governmental characteristics such as the use of nonpartisan elections and the proportion of the city council that is elected at large made little contribution in the implicit first stage of the instrumental variable procedure. The sociology literature tends to argue that, in theory, mayors may be more responsive to minority needs than city manto alter black economic outcomes directly and, therefore, is a legitimate instrument. There is no evidence of significant correlations between the city-manager variable and preexisting trends in nonwhite income, employment, or unemployment. 43 Our second instrumental variable strategy is to make use of weather data for April of 1968. The idea is that a specific, identifiable event-the assassination of Martin Luther King-greatly increased the likelihood of a riot during the month. However, in places where the weather was unfavorable, and especially in places where it rained, riots may have been less likely or less severe. 44 Although, as far as we know, rainfall has not been considered in the sociology literature on the 1960s riots, there is anecdotal evidence that rain has dampened or precluded political protests and civil disturbances at various times and places. For example, in his discussion of "the riot that didn't happen," Sidney Fine notes that rainfall played a key role in defusing an emerging riot in Detroit in August 1966. 45 Most recently, after two nights of riots, a CNN.com headline on June 19, 2003, read "Rain, curfew help bring quiet night to Benton Harbor." 46 The instruments hold up well in the implicit first stage of our two-agers, but the evidence does not support that hypothesis. Spilerman (1976) finds a positive correlation between mayors and riots; Eisinger (1973) finds a positive correlation between mayors and black protest activity, and we find a significant negative correlation between riot severity and city managers. The negative correlation is consistent with the view that use of city managers led to greater "professionalism" in local government in general and police who are better prepared to deal with civil disturbances in particular, but we admit that this is pure speculation. 43. Regressing the 1950-60 change in nonwhite family income, change in nonwhite unemployment rate, and change in nonwhite employment rate on the city manager variable yields the following coefficients: -0.047 (t-stat = 0.58) for income; -0.004 (t-stat = 0.46) for unemployment; 0.003 (t-stat = 0.21) for employment. The samples are similar to those in tables 2A, 3A, and 4A and control for region, black and total population size, and manufacturing employment.
44. Riot activity was very high in the two weeks after the assassination, but even later in the month, riot activity was substantially higher than in previous Aprils (1964-67). So we used rainfall for the entire month. When we limit the "rain window" to ten days after the assassination, we get broadly similar results. The Kerner Commission did note that several cities with substantial riots in 1967 seemed to have relatively high temperatures around the time of the riots (1968, p. 123 ). This observation has been supported in statistical analyses by Baron and Ransberger (1978) and Carlsmith and Anderson (1979) . There is a more general criminology literature that links temperature and violent crime (for example, see Field [1992] ). We may attempt to use temperature variation as a second weather instrument in future work.
45. Fine (1989, p. 4 
City-level Results
To estimate the effect on median family income, we use a "broad" and a "narrow" sample. The broad sample includes all available cities for comparison. The narrow sample uses a smaller set of comparison cities for which the 1950 IPUMS can be used to establish a pre-1960 trend in nonwhite income. Table 2A reports estimates of the riots' effect on the change in median black family income between 1960 and 1970. The first three columns all use the raw index numbers for severity (in quadratic form), whereas the last six columns use a dummy variable for severe riot cities. The last three columns are two-stage least square estimates of the riot impact, relying on the instrumental variables discussed above. Columns 3, 6, and 9 include controls for the 1950-60 trend in black family incomes for a reduced set of cities. To help distinguish the influence of changing sample composition from that of changing specification, columns 2, 5, and 8 exclude the trend variable but use the reduced sample of cities.
Column 1's results indicate that riots were associated with slower income growth for blacks through the relevant range of the riot index (0 to 0.5). The coefficients suggest a maximum negative impact around a riot index value of 0.3 (approximately the center of the "severe riot" range). At that point, the estimated negative riot effect on median black family income is greater than 12 percent. Moving to the smaller sample (column 2) and adding the 1950-60 trend (column 3) has a small impact on the estimated riot effect-the profile becomes steeper but still reaches a maximum impact around 0.3, at which point the riot effect on income is almost negative 16 percent. The significant positive coefficient on the South dummy variable reflects the convergence of southern blacks' incomes on the incomes of blacks elsewhere. Qualitatively, the results are similar in columns 4 to 6, which replace the quadratic severity index with a simple dummy variable for cities that had the most severe riot experiences. In each column, the estimated riot effect on black income is about -0.09 and statistically significant. The 2SLS point estimates for the riot effect (columns 7 to 9) are larger in magnitude and somewhat weaker in terms of statistical significance (though still significant at the 10 percent level at least). All of the results in table 2A are consistent with a nontrivial negative effect of riots on black income. Table 2B reports results for similar regressions, run for the 1960 to 1980 period. The results suggest that the riots' effects were not transitory. Cities that experienced riot-associated relative declines in income during the 1960s did not catch up during the 1970s. The coefficients in columns 1 to 6 are roughly similar in magnitude to those from table 2A, but the estimated riot-effect profile is somewhat steeper in the quadratic specifications of columns 1 to 3 (reaching an impact of -0.22 in column 1 at a riot index value of 0.3). Similarly, column 4 estimates an average "severe riot city" effect of about 12 percent (compared with 9 percent in table 2A), and again, the 2SLS coefficients increase in magnitude, as do the associated standard errors.
We have checked the robustness of the basic income results (columns 1 and 4 of tables 2A and 2B) in several ways: we limited the sample to cities with at least 50,000 black residents in 1960 (essentially, a large city sample); we split the sample into southern and nonsouthern cities and ran separate regressions; and we replaced the quadratic severity index with a quadratic in the number of persons killed in riots. In each case, the negative and statistically significant (or nearly so) association of riots with declines in median black family income persists.
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The true nature of these apparent relative income declines is difficult to discern from the city-level data. Two distinct, but not necessarily exclusive, hypotheses suggest themselves. First, the riots could have negatively affected the labor market outcomes of people residing in the riot cities throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Second, relatively high-income blacks could have moved out of riot cities after their occurrence, leading to a decline in average income of those remaining (a compositional change). Though imperfect, we can use measures of median schooling 48. These results are available from the authors on request. ) does not undercut the estimated riot effect, though it does have a positive, independent relation to income changes. Furthermore, regressing the change in education on measures of riot severity, region dummies, and so on suggests that there was no significant difference in the change in education levels between the severe riot cities and others. Thus the compositional story does not seem to drive the negative income results, at least for the 1960s. A third potential avenue would be for family units (over which median income is measured) to disintegrate faster in the riot cities than elsewhere; in particular, a relative increase in the proportion of female-headed households could drive a relative decline in the census measure of median family income. The published city-level data are not consistently detailed enough to test this hypothesis, but we intend to explore the issue in future research. Tables 3A and 3B report estimates of the effect of riots on male unemployment rates. Since black (or nonwhite) unemployment figures are available for 1950 for all the cities, there is no change in sample composition across the columns. Columns 1, 4, and 7 control only for region; columns 2, 5, and 8 add variables for total and black population size and the proportion of employment in manufacturing; and columns 3, 6, and 9 include the 1950-60 unemployment trend as an independent variable. There is no strong evidence that riot severity affected black male unemployment rates, and in fact, most of the point estimates suggest a relative decline in measured unemployment rates (though not statistically significant). Tables 4A and 4B repeat the exercise for male employment ratios (defined as the ratio of employed males over the male population above a particular age). 49 Here, we find little evidence of a short-run effect (between 1960 and 1970) , especially when we include a preexisting trend. However, the long-run effect is strongly negative even when con-trolling for the preexisting trend: measuring between 4 and 8 percentage points in columns 4 to 6. Like the results for median income, the 2SLS coefficients are larger (but less precisely estimated) than the OLS coefficients. Thus, even though variation in the city-level black male unemployment rate is weakly correlated with riot severity (table 3B), it seems that between 1960 and 1980 there were especially large declines in black male employment rates in cities with severe riots (table 4B) . Further evidence on the riots' effect on employment is gleaned from the IPUMS data in the following pages. Table 5A reports estimates of the riots's impact on the black share of total city population during the 1960s. Controlling only for region (columns 1, 4, and 7), it is clear that cities that had riots had comparatively large increases in the share of the city population that was black. The differences are large and statistically significant, reaching a maximum impact of about 0.11 in column 1 and an average "severe riot city" effect of 0.07 in column 4. As more variables are added to the regressions, however, the estimated riot effects diminish in magnitude: the maximum impact suggested by column 3 (after accounting for 1950-60 trend) is only about 0.03, and in column 6 is smaller yet. After accounting for the 1950-60 trend in black population share, the 2SLS estimate in column 9 yields a very small (and imprecise) point estimate. Qualitatively, the results from table 5B, which cover 1960 to 1980, are quite similar to those in table 5A: severe riots were strongly positively correlated with increases in black population share, but those increases were apparently well under way before the riots occurred.
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Microlevel IPUMS Data
Our second empirical analysis uses individual-level data for men living in metropolitan areas from the 1950, 1970, and 1980 IPUMS. Unfortunately, metropolitan areas are not disclosed in the 1960 sample, and it is not possible to observe both metropolitan area and central-city status simultaneously in the available 1970 samples. Together, these limitations 50. Similar regressions run for the size of city population return somewhat similar results. Cities with severe riots lost population relative to those that did not (by about 8 percent during the 1960s, controlling only for region), but as more control variables are added, the negative population effect tends to diminish. Because cities change geographic size in nontrivial ways over time, we view the "total population" results as highly speculative. imply that we cannot make microlevel comparisons between 1960 and other years, and we cannot limit the scope to central-city black residents. Despite several differences between this second analysis and that of the previous section, the basic identification strategy is the same: to compare changes in labor market outcomes in areas that had severe riots with areas that did not. The regressions are estimated by OLS and take the following basic form, where Y is an individual's labor market outcome (income or employment) and S is a dummy variable equal to one for metro areas that had severe riots.
In this specification, b 4 measures the average change in Y for black workers in the severe riot cities relative to blacks in nonsevere riot cities, after accounting for differences in personal and regional characteristics (X). The X variables include age (quartic), education (quadratic), marital status, migrant status (dummy for those residing in state that is different from birth state, dummy for foreign born), region or residence indicators (four regions), and region interacted with the year dummy (allowing for region-specific trends). We compare 1950 with 1970 in one set of regressions, and we compare 1970 and 1980 in a second set (Year = 1 in the later year of the comparison). It is possible to include metro-area fixed effects in these regressions. Doing so makes it impossible to identify coefficients on any time-invariant city characteristics, but b 4 is still identifiable. We also report difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) estimates, which use white workers to provide another layer of comparison. We do not rely heavily on the DDD estimates because whites might not form an effective control group to the extent that they too were affected by or responded to the riots, but the perspective is nevertheless still of interest. The DDD estimates indicate whether blacks in severe riot cities fared worse relative to whites in severe riot cities than blacks in nonsevere riot cities fared relative to whites in nonsevere riot cities.
Panel A of table 6 reports results for log annual income among male workers who were between 18 and 64 years of age, were not in school, and worked at least forty weeks in the relevant year. Column 1 suggests that blacks in severe riot cities lost some ground (about 2 percent) relative to blacks living in other cities between 1950 and 1970, though the decline is not statistically significant. The addition of city fixed effects in column 2 has little impact on the coefficient, indicating that unobserved city-specific fixed factors did not drive the result. The estimates in columns 3 and 4, using a DDD approach, are nearly identical to those in columns 1 and 2, suggesting that the relative decline of blacks in severe riot cities (relative to blacks elsewhere) was not matched by a similar decline among whites (relative to whites elsewhere). The point estimates for the 1970s (columns 5 and 6) are similar in magnitude, but more precisely estimated, suggesting a relative decline of 2.5 to 3.0 percent in blacks' annual income in the riot cities. These losses are smaller, but still negative, when differenced by white income trends in columns 7 and 8.
Conditioning the sample on those who worked at least forty weeks makes a significant difference to the magnitude of the estimates for income changes in the 1970s. 52 Removing the "working" condition entirely and rerunning the regression in column 5 with all men 18 to 64 (and not in school) results in a severe-riot coefficient of -0.085 (t-stat = 5.12). Including only men who were in the labor force (regardless of weeks worked) results in a severe-riot coefficient estimate of -0.065 (tstat = 4.04). (Regressions are not in table.) These findings suggest that there were relatively poor employment prospects in severe riots during the 1970s, and we explore this possibility directly in panel B of table 6.
The employment regressions show no decline in the likelihood of employment for black men between 1950 and 1970 in severe riot states; if anything, the likelihood appears to have risen. There is evidence, however, of a 3 to 4 percentage point decline in the employment rate of black men in severe riot cities during the 1970s. This decline is consistent and statistically significant across columns 5 through 8. Moreover, the decline seems to be stronger among younger black workers: the coeffi- Table 6 . Riots, Income, and Employment in the IPUMS Data : 1950-70 2: 1950-70 3: 1950-70 4: 1950-70 5: 1970-80 6: 1970-80 7: 1970-80 8: 1970- Ruggles, Sobek, and others (1997) . Riot data are from Carter (1986) and discussed in table 1. Note: Each coefficient is from a separate regression. t statistics are in parentheses. All regressions include males, 18 to 64 years old, who are not in school. The income regressions only include those employed for at least 40 weeks in the preceding year. Standard errors are clustered by metropolitan area in regressions without fixed effects. All regressions control for age (quartic), education level (quadratic), marital status, migrant status (dummies for foreign born and those born in a state different from residence), region of residence, year dummy, interactions of region and year dummies, dummy for severe riot areas, interaction of severe riot area and year dummies. All of these control variables are interacted with a black dummy variable in the DDD regressions.
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cient in column 5 increases in magnitude to 4.5 percentage points when the sample is limited to men under 40 years of age, and to 6 percentage points when limited to men under 30. The declining employment rate reflects both a decline in labor force participation and a rise in unemployment relative to blacks elsewhere. Regressing labor force participation (=1 if in labor force) on the same set of variables as in column 5 returns a riot coefficient of -0.021 (t-stat = 2.83). Limiting the sample to those in the labor force and using unemployed status as the dependent variable yields a coefficient of 0.022 (t-stat = 2.69).
Conclusion
In the 1960s, the United States experienced a large number of racerelated civil disturbances. Although social scientists have long studied the riots' causes, the riots' consequences have received much less attention. The riots were concentrated in neighborhoods that were predominantly African American, and in theory, they may have depressed the relative economic status of some African Americans through a downward spiral in neighborhood employment opportunities, property values, and peer quality. Measuring such effects is difficult, in large part because the riots may have been responses to unobserved forces that also simultaneously influenced labor markets. Nonetheless, given Spilerman's contention that the distribution and severity of riots were essentially random (conditional on black population size and region), and alternatively, given the scope for instrumental variable estimation that isolates plausibly exogenous variation in riot severity, we believe that a solid measurement of riot treatment effects is within reach.
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Thus far, the empirical evidence on the riots' effects on African Americans' labor market outcomes is mixed but highly suggestive and worthy of further exploration. Our examination of data from the published census volumes and the IPUMS samples suggests the existence of adverse riot effects on family income and male employment. For example, controlling for region and city characteristics, median family income declined significantly after 1960 in the cities that had severe riots relative to those that did not. A relative decline in annual income for males is also apparent in the microlevel data spanning the 1970s, especially when the sample is widened to include men who worked relatively few weeks. The microlevel data also reveal a relative decline in the likelihood of male employment and labor force participation during the 1970s in the riot cities. Since all of these effects are measured by comparing blacks' outcomes across cities, and since it is possible that there were negative spillovers from the severe riots to other cities, our estimates of the riots' effects might be understated.
At this stage, our empirical results should be viewed as highly tentative. Besides considerable refinement to the data and analysis presented in this paper, we plan to extend our analysis to other economic outcomes, especially those related to housing markets, such as housing values and residential segregation. 54 We also intend to explore other sources of data. In particular, the analysis in this paper has looked for effects using citylevel measures of riot severity on rather widely spaced (in a temporal sense) census data. It seems clear from our preliminary analysis that riot effects exist, but they are difficult to tease out of the data. To do so, one extension would be to explore the public use samples of the March Current Population Survey (CPS), which became available annually in the mid-1960s. While the CPS does not identify the city of residence for all individuals, it does identify the major cities, some of which had severe riots. Another strategy is to look for effects at a smaller geographic scale. We are in the process of matching maps of riot activity in cities with census tract maps to facilitate an "up close" look at the neighborhoods in which the riots occurred. Further work with the CPS and census tract data may provide a better sense of where and when the effects of riots took hold. Jacob Vigdor: Unfortunately, race riots are not a thing of the past. From Benton Harbor, Michigan, to Sydney, Australia, violent and destructive outbreaks in minority neighborhoods continue to make headlines in the twenty-first century. As William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo note, a considerable amount of social science research has sought to determine the causes of riots, perhaps in the hope that public policy offers some remedy that can prevent future events. Any such remedy, whether in the guise of governmental reform or redistributive policy, is likely to impose significant costs on society. To determine whether these costs are worth bearing, a complete accounting of the social costs of riots is indispensable. Collins and Margo make an important point: that the social costs of riots are likely to extend far beyond the bricks-and-mortar costs of rebuilding and revitalizing individual neighborhoods. As the authors' analysis and my comments should make clear, the costs identified in this paper are likely to represent only a fraction of the total. As Collins and Margo note, however, this work is but the beginning of an extensive, well-planned, and important research agenda.
Riots, by altering the risk perceptions of firms and households, should make certain neighborhoods less attractive places to live and work. Collins and Margo note the labor demand impact of this change-indeed, it serves as the central motivation for this study-but there are several other noteworthy implications. Demand for residential location in highrisk neighborhoods should decline as well: property destruction is presumably a disamenity to both firms and consumers. It is thus a straight-
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Comments forward prediction that rents will decline in riot-prone neighborhoods.
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Owners of property will experience negative wealth effects; renters will witness a reduction in housing costs to offset some or all (or even more than all) of the utility loss associated with increased risk. Table 7 presents some basic evidence consistent with these implications. The table tracks basic census statistics for a single census tract in Detroit Michigan-sixteen blocks incorporating the epicenter of the 1967 riots. The neighborhood at the heart of the riot had within the past generation "tipped" from an ethnic enclave populated largely by Russian and Polish immigrants and their children to an overwhelmingly black neighborhood. Through this transition, the population was trending gradually downward, while vacancy rates remained stable and average rents maintained some premium over the citywide average. Three years after the riot, the census recorded an accelerating population decline, a significant relative drop in rents, and a noteworthy uptick in vacancy rates. Changes in census tract boundaries preclude the further tracking of this neighborhood through time, but the immediate response of the local property market to the riot seems consistent with basic economic logic.
What of the labor market implications of riots? As Collins and Margo point out, there are reasons to think any such impact would be muted. In the long run, we expect people to move out of a geographic area rather than stay perpetually unemployed. Moreover, if households are more averse to riot-prone neighborhoods than firms, remaining households 55. Roback (1982) . might witness a relative increase in job prospects. To believe that riots have long-term labor market effects, one must believe that residents of affected neighborhoods face obstacles to relocation and to taking jobs in areas outside their own neighborhood. Theoretical arguments in favor of such barriers have been made for many years, but empirical evidence on the spatial mismatch hypothesis, and of the influence of neighborhood on labor market outcomes in general, has been quite mixed. Table 7 confirms the notion that the impact of riots on labor market outcomes is more ambiguous than the impact on property markets. As the neighborhood surrounding the epicenter of the 1967 riot transitioned from white to black between 1940 and 1960, residents' labor market outcomes tracked downwards. As of 1960, the unemployment rate of tract residents was significantly higher, and median income significantly lower, than the citywide average. The 1960s did not witness an acceleration of this trend; if anything, labor market outcomes of tract residents improved relative to the city as a whole. While this very basic analysis can be faulted on numerous grounds, it confirms basic economic intuition: riots may be harmful to locations (and those who own property in those locations) in the long run, but they are less harmful to people.
Of course, calling riots "less harmful" to individual labor market outcomes does not imply that no harm is done. Collins and Margo present some fairly convincing evidence of a negative impact of severe riots on black labor market outcomes. Not all of this evidence passes the threshold of statistical significance, but across data sets and empirical specifications there is a clear consistency to the findings. There are two major empirical concerns with the evidence, and the authors focus considerable attention on each. The first is a concern about reverse causality: the propensity to riot could be a function of declining economic fortunes in a community. Collins and Margo present evidence that riot severity is not linked to preexisting trends, as well as specifications utilizing instrumental variables based on weather and city government structure. The second concern is that observed changes in labor market outcomes among black residents of a particular city might reflect selective migration rather than any true causal impact of riots. To address this concern, Collins and Margo control for some basic measures of changes in the composition of the population and use census microdata to control for a broader array of individual characteristics.
Concerns about the economic fortunes of central-city black neighborhoods certainly predate the spate of riots analyzed in this paper. John Kain's seminal article on the spatial mismatch between black neighborhoods and centers of employment growth, published one month after Martin Luther King's assassination, makes no mention of riots or civic unrest. 56 The role of riots in the decline of the American inner city will surely be debated for decades to come. Collins and Margo, by providing evidence of a long-term cost associated with riots that almost certainly underestimates the full economic cost, have contributed significantly to this debate.
Daniel Myers:
Civil disorders, or "riots" in the common parlance, can be very destructive events. A riot that directly causes severe damage is rare, but the ensuing social psychological effects of civil violence can be far more destructive. Especially when a series of riots occur that are similar in character or location, danger and fear build and become associated with the places and people connected to the riots, and the behaviors present in the most dramatic events are then assumed to have occurred in other civil disturbances and other neighborhoods. When we think, for example, of the riots of the 1960s, the images that dominate are those of Watts in 1965, Newark and Detroit in 1967, and Washington in 1968-four of the most destructive and deadly riots in American history. Who, in their right mind, would be attracted to these areas to open a business, find employees, or live? And, assuming that our images of these riots reflect rioting that occurred elsewhere, businesses and individuals would by repelled by rioting no matter where it occurred. This is the logic behind an analysis that asks the important question: do riots lead to longterm economic deterioration for the areas where the riots occurred and for the people associated with them?
Linking collective violence and economic conditions is not new, of course, but scholars have mainly used economic conditions as predictors of riots, expecting that riots were most likely to break out where economic conditions were poor and grievances about living conditions plentiful.
57 But William J. Collins and Robert A. Margo take a different tactic and attempt to show that, whether or not economic conditions cause riots, riots end up having an effect on economic conditions. Although they are not alone in examining this question, their analysis adds a sophistication and thoroughness that moves us toward some less equivocal conclusions about this relationship.
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The project is a difficult one, however, and it produces some trying challenges for the researchers-challenges that give one pause as one assesses the ideas and results in this study. As someone who is intimately familiar with these data and the characteristics of these civil disorders, my immediate reaction is to question whether it is even reasonable to suspect that the overwhelming majority of these riots could have any discernible economic impact at all. It is not hard to accept that Watts 1965 or Detroit 1967 could have had such effects, but these are extreme and rare cases. Most riots were, in fact, minor skirmishes compared with what happened in Watts, and the chances of a more typical riot having an economic impact on an entire city fifteen or more years later seems remote.
Consider the severity of riots in Gregg Carter's outstanding data set.
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Suppose we separated these riots into quintiles and examine the line that separates the most severe quintile from the other 80 percent of the riots. A riot at this level would be relatively severe, although not among the most severe. One riot at this level was characterized by thirty-one arrests, at least one fire or arson attempt, four days of activity, five injured, and no one killed. Another at this level had forty-two arrests, one or more fires, fifty-one injured, no one killed, and lasted one day. It is hard to imagine that these riots could produce any effect that would linger for twenty years. In fact, one could probably find a more severe compilation of activity on many large college campuses the night after a home football game. Even if we move up to the ninetieth percentile, that activity is not stunning: seventy arrests, no fire, ten days of activity, nineteen injured, and no one killed. This is probably a newsworthy event, but how could it have a long-term effect on labor market outcomes? A challenge then exists for the researchers to develop a plausible mechanism that could theoretically and practically produce such an effect. A second difficulty with such analysis is determining whether or not the relationships the analysts find have a causal connection-riots and bad economic conditions may be related, but does the former really cause the latter? The authors dutifully address this problem, and they recognize the possibility that some unobserved exogenous factor could be driving the link shown between riots and economic outcomes. They approach the problem in several ways, one of which is inserting some very reasonably selected control into the models. Given that the effects hold up, they have a stronger claim that there is a nonspurious relationship here.
The problem is, however, that one can never be certain the model is adequately specified and that something important has not been left out.
It is a particularly difficult quandary in the present study because past attempts to find predictors of riots have been such a dismal failure. It is possible, as Spilerman concluded more than thirty years ago, that nothing really matters other than city size and regional location. But one wonders if for some reasons related to available data and variable specification, we have not just collectively missed some important processes that produce rioting, and also in this case, poor economic outcomes. Collins and Margo make a reasonable attempt to include some important controls, but as the effects are not overwhelming and are reduced through collinearity with some of the controls, one wonders whether adding a few more variables would eliminate the observed effects.
If that did occur, we could apply a quite different and plausible interpretation to the whole situation: riots are simply an indicator of another ongoing social and economic process. That is, riots are an endogenous outcome and do not really contribute anything to the trajectory of economic outcome on their own. They are, in essence, a bellwether of problems, but not a cause of them. Just as one example of an important variable that might be missing, consider policing. Police presence and behavior have much to do with both escalating and controlling riotsand at the same time, police density reflects the fiscal health of the city government, which might in turn provide greater or fewer resources to deal with the problems driving riots. Or municipal spending on policing compared with other social programs and services may belie an underlying orientation toward social control versus community developmentwhich has implications for both rioting and economic outcomes in poor black neighborhoods.
These caveats are important and remind us to maintain reasonable vigilance when reading Collins and Margo, but despite the misgivings raised, one ultimately finds Collins and Margo convincing or at least provocative. It is true that the effects reported are not overpowering, and they might weaken further if the authors were able to make certain shifts in the analysis, but there are other reasons, some of them hinted at by the authors, to believe that the effects are very much understated.
First, we must recognize that as the riots of the 1960s not only reacted to economic and social problems and may have contributed to further problems, they also called attention to those problems and were viewed by many as a call for help. When a call for help is issued, help is sometimes delivered-often too little, too late, and too fleeting to rectify the situation, but help that nonetheless may offset some of the negative effects of the riots that are identified by Collins and Margo. The model cities program, no matter how short-lived, is an obvious example of a response designed to address the supposed sources and outcomes of riots. 60 More recently, the riot in Benton Harbor, Michigan, led Governor Jennifer M. Granholm to appoint a community task force charged with studying the problems faced by the city. It remains to be seen if substantial change will emerge from the seeds planted by the task force, but at least there is work being done, commitments being made, and energy being developed and expended that may offset some of the negative effects of that riot.
Given this reaction, the negative effects the authors detect would be even more pronounced when the "call for help" that emanates from a riot falls on deaf ears. We might speculate, for example, that under the current administration and economic conditions, the effects of riots will be more detrimental than in the past. In the report of the Benton Harbor Task Force, the authors make it clear on the first page of the executive summary that no resources to support their recommendations are going to be provided by the state. 61 Michigan, like many states, is facing a massive deficit and cannot afford to pour resources into addressing the problems in Benton Harbor.
A second reason that effects are probably understated is that the measurement is rather blunt. In some sense this is unavoidable because the data necessary to do the analyses are often not available on the level we would prefer-which in this case is the neighborhood or the area where riots did their damage. Riots should be expected to have stronger effects where they occur than on the city as a whole. Areas that are farther away from riots, dominated by whites, well-to-do, and rather suburban in character are not likely to feel much of an impact from racial civil disorders. In fact, they may benefit if businesses and residents move away from riot-prone areas. Unfortunately, conducting an analysis on the city level (the unit for which most data are available) combines these two types of areas and necessarily dilutes the apparent effects of riots. The solution to this problem is to reduce the size of the units of analysis. The problem, of course, is that moving to that size of unit also means losing important control variables.
The third source of understated effects, and perhaps the most consequential, is a different issue related to the unit of analysis. Collins and Margo are attempting to show local differences in economic conditions based on local occurrence of riots. But what if the effect of local riots is not really local in character? The authors mention this possibility when they are discussing the assumptions of the study, but it warrants a bit more attention. What if the wave of riots as a group had an effect on all poor black neighborhoods-whether those neighborhoods had a riot or not?
Returning to Spilerman's classic studies for a moment, it is true that once he controlled for black population size and region, the effects of economic variables he tested were insubstantial. This did not mean that economic conditions did not have any effects on rioting, though. It meant that local variation in economic conditions did not produce local differences in riot occurrence. In his discussion of the finding, he does not disavow economic conditions or grievances; instead, he suggests that the poor conditions that afflicted the black community were so widespread, prevalent, and well understood as grievances particular to the black community that they increased the chances of rioting in a similar way everywhere. 62 In effect, such conditions produced a blanket effect across the United States. This is a very different understanding of the connection between economic conditions and rioting than is typically recounted by readers of Spilerman's work. 63 The idea driving Spilerman's discussion can be extended easily to the chapter by Collins and Margor as well. What the authors have found is that local riots damage local economic outcomes, but rather weakly. What if the effects of riots are not limited to the local environment? What if, for example, riots cause flight from, and reluctance to invest in, poor black areas that have not experienced riots? The idea is that riots give these kinds of neighborhoods a bad name-not just the specific neighborhoods themselves.
This kind of outcome becomes even more likely when a wave or string of riots is clustered in time and relatively widespread. Isolated riots are more likely to become associated with their immediate locale, but a large number of riots lose that specificity. When this happens, they are more likely to contribute to the general impression that certain neighborhoods are poor prospects for development and investment of human capital.
As in Spilerman's study, a widespread effect will seem to dilute the apparent impact of riots on their local environments because the riot is making things worse in nonriot communities as well. Thus, when we compare riot and nonriot areas, the difference between the two is less than it would be if the riots had a more localized effect. This leads to underestimation of the effects in two ways: the difference between riot and nonriot areas is diminished, and the negative effect of riots on nonriot areas is completely invisible to the analysis.
In the end, then, I am making two recommendations for future study: We should both restrict and expand the scope of the study. First, we should restrict it by reducing the size of the units whenever possible so that we are combining poor black neighborhoods with rich white ones. Second, we should expand by recognizing that effects might have an impact beyond the immediate local environment. The latter aim is a bit trickier to accomplish, but considerations of distance decay between units or measure of structural equivalence could produce more nuance in hypotheses about where these riots could have effects.
